1	JONATHAN R. BASS (State Bar No. 75779)						
	FREDRICK C. CROMBIE (State Bar No. 244051						
2	ANTHONY D. RISUCCI (State Bar No. 316587)						
	COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP						
3	One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000						
	San Francisco, California 94104-5500						
4	Telephone: 415.391.4800						
	Facsimile: 415.989.1663						
5	Email: ef-jrb@cpdb.com						
	ef-fcc@cpdb.com						
6	ef-adr@cpdb.com						
7	Attorneys for Plaintiff						
	HUNDŘED ACRE WINE GROUP, INC.						
8							

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF NAPA

)

HUNDRED ACRE WINE GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

COUNTY OF NAPA, a political subdivision of the State of California,

Defendant.

Plaintiff HUNDRED ACRE WINE GROUP, INC. ("Hundred Acre" or "Plaintiff") alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This Action is being brought in order to impose legal and constitutional limits on a pattern and practice of significant administrative overreach by Defendant COUNTY OF NAPA (the "County" or "Defendant") and, in particular, its Department of Planning, Building & Environmental Services. The County has, without proper legal authority, denied and threatened to deny, the rights of property owners, including Plaintiff, to use and enjoy their lands in a productive and environmentally responsible manner. The County assertion of authority has come to vastly exceed, and to lack any reasonable foundation in, the actual text of the environmental and other

land use regulations the County's purports to enforce.

- 2. Many landowners in the region, including vineyard owners like Plaintiff, have been confronted with mountainous red tape and endless bureaucratic obstacles, when applying for permits to develop productive vineyards to which the land is ideally suited. The County employs delay tactics, demands expensive, onerous and duplicative submissions and reports, with the intention, and the effect, of delaying and avoiding its responsibility to allow legally permitted use of private lands for agricultural purposes, and to deter would-be applicants from pursuing such uses of their land because of the burdensome attorney and expert fees that are necessitated by the County's practices, and by the arbitrariness of the County's decision-making process. Indeed, it is not unusual for County staff—which is prone to high turnover—to request that applicant reports be redone and/or updated due solely to the County's own years-long administrative delays in reviewing proposed projects.
- 3. In this case, the County is attempting to deprive Plaintiff of its property rights with its erroneous interpretation and application of Chapter 18.108 of the County Code of Ordinances (the "Conservation Regulations"). Specifically, it is threatening to penalize Plaintiff for clearing from its property the dead, charred remains of trees incinerated by the 2020 Glass Fire—a widespread and environmentally appropriate activity for which the County has not taken any other public enforcement—to prevent Plaintiff from planting a unique, experimental, dry-farmed vineyard using novel, non-erosive techniques that do not disturb any of the soils on Plaintiff's land, and instead force Plaintiff to "revegetate" the land with the same type of high-fire-risk trees that fueled the 2017 and 2020 wildfires.
- 4. The County's threatened enforcement action against Plaintiff is environmentally irresponsible and dangerous. It deprives Plaintiff of the productive use to which its property is ideally suited, and would increase the risk and spread of future wildfires. It is, moreover, directly contrary to the explicit text of the Conservation Regulations, which does not grant the County the authority it is threatening to assert or allow the County to regulate the uses Plaintiff has made of its land.

5. The County cannot assert authority where none exists. Judicial intervention is required to prevent it from doing so here.

THE PARTIES

- 6. Plaintiff HUNDRED ACRE WINE GROUP, INC. is a California corporation licensed to do business in California, with its principal place of business located in St. Helena, California. Plaintiff is the owner of that certain real property located at 2353 and 2355 Pickett Road, Calistoga, California (Assessor Parcel Nos. 018-050-064 and 018-050-065; the "Property").
 - 7. Defendant COUNTY OF NAPA is a political subdivision of the State of California.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 8. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.
- 9. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 394(a) because this is an action against the County of Napa.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- II. The Glass Fire Incinerates Most Of The Property; A Year Later Plaintiff Clears Away The Debris.
- 10. In August and September of 2020, Napa County was struck by two significant wildfire events. The second of those events, known as the "Glass Fire," started on September 27, 2020 at 3:48 a.m., and was not "contained" until October 20, 2020, some twenty-three days later. By that time, it had burned 67,484 acres of land and destroyed 1,555 structures. The Glass Fire's lasting effects can still be seen in, among other ways, the form of blackened hillsides littered with dead and dying trees.
- 11. Just prior to the Glass Fire, Plaintiff's Property consisted of two parcels totaling 113 acres of land, approximately 80 acres of which was comprised of volcanic rock hillside with minimal soil coverage, populated by mostly manzanitas, bay trees, and scrub, and a small number of oak and digger pine trees. That 80-acre portion of the Property was utterly destroyed by the Glass Fire, which burned so hot on the Property that it vaporized a decades-old 1.5 inch metal cable left over from logging activities conducted uphill of the Property decades ago, and elsewhere

on the Property melted safe vaults, and the steel structure of Plaintiff's barn leading to its total destruction. The insides of trees on the Property burned for days and weeks until the incinerated remains of those trees collapsed into themselves. The remaining stumps continued to burn for months. By the time the fires on the Property were fully and finally burned out, virtually none of the pre-existing vegetation on that undeveloped 80-acre portion remained.

- 12. Fire-killed trees of the sort left on Plaintiff's Property are a serious hazard. Fire-killed trees that are still standing may fall at any time, creating personal injury hazards and hazards to structures and downhill vineyards. Fire-killed tree stumps may have entire root structures that are burned through, leaving underground voids that are subject to collapse. Even if the roots of fire-killed trees and stumps are not burned through, they will, over time, decompose, resulting in a complete loss of erosion control assistance. Fire-killed trees and stumps, attract woodboring beetles that, if not controlled, can destroy or imperil nearby trees or even entire forests.

 Landscapes of fire-killed trees and stumps are eyesores and constant reminders to the community of the physical devastation and emotional trauma wrought by the 2020 wildfires.
- Property exhibited any signs of recovery, and none provided any canopy coverage whatsoever. In order to remediate this environmentally unacceptable condition, in or around late September or early October 2021, Plaintiff began removing the remains of those fire-killed trees and stumps from a small portion of the Property nearest to the roadway and surviving structures. None of that activity involved any excavation. Indeed, no excavation was necessary—the tree and stump remains located on the Property were so thoroughly burned through that those remains could simply be picked up or pushed over, and carried away. The remediation also did not involve any vegetation *removal*, because the only material removed was comprised of the charred remains of dead trees and stumps—no live vegetation was disturbed or removed. Moreover, none of those charred remains were removed "to prepare a site for the construction of roads, structures, landscaping, new planting, and other improvements" (Napa County Code § 18.108.030 [defining "earthmoving or earth-disturbing activity"])—they were removed solely for the purpose of mitigating what had become a charred, unsafe and unsightly landscape. In other words, the

removal of those fire-killed trees and stumps was not "earthmoving or earth-disturbing activity" as defined by Section 18.108.030 of the Conservation Regulations, nor "vegetation clearing" or "vegetation removal" as those phrases are used in the Conservation Regulations.

14. Plaintiff's clearing of these charred remains from its Property was conducted openly and in full view of neighbors and the larger community. There were no complaints by the neighbors, whose own properties were enhanced by the remediation of the devastated hillside. There were also no complaints, no enforcement activity, and no mention of the Conservation Regulations (defined below), by any County official or employee. That lack of response by the County was consistent with its general approach (and unwritten policy) of not taking action against property owners that have removed, or are removing, from their properties the remains of trees and stumps killed or significantly damaged by the 2020 wildfires. Indeed many, many other landowners' similar efforts to clear dead and fire-damaged trees and stumps can readily be viewed from any of the County's major roadways, including Highway 29 and Silverado Trail, yet no known enforcement activity was taken against those owners.

II. Plaintiff Lays Out A Small, Experimental Patch Of Rootstock; The County Tries Aggressively To Enforce Inapplicable Conservation Regulations

- 15. In or about November 2021, Plaintiff learned that, prior to conversion of the valley floor to vineyards, Napa Valley farmers had historically dry-farmed winegrape vineyards on the hillsides so that the valley floor could be utilized for food crops. Armed with this knowledge, Plaintiff began investigating the possibility of dry farming winegrape vines introduced onto the Property without undertaking any disturbance of the soil or other erosive activity. If successful, such a dry-farmed vineyard would provide numerous benefits, including increased erosion control with a vineyard that would develop the deep and extensive root growth required to reach water sources in the ground; a substantial protective fire-break guarding the Property's, and neighboring properties' structures; a more beautiful view when compared to the barren, burned-out landscape left behind by the Glass Fire; and potentially an economically productive use of the land.
- 16. By about May 2022, Plaintiff had devised a unique method to install that small experimental vineyard without disturbing any of, and thereby preserving all of, the soils on the

Property. The method involves placing a small, bottomless vessel on the ground, and filling that
vessel with compost and a single rootstock. The rootstock then grows through the compost and
roots into the soil without any tilling, drilling, or other soil disturbing activities. In other words,
the layout of the vineyard would involve no "earthmoving or earth-disturbing activity" as that
phrase is defined by the Section 18.108.030 of the Conservation Regulations, and would not
constitute "planting" as that term is commonly used because the rootstock would not be put or set
in the ground, but instead would naturally grow into it. The purpose of the experimental vineyard
was to determine (i) whether the rootstock would, in fact, root into the unprepared ground, and
(ii) whether, once rooted, the rootstock and grafted vines could be successfully dry farmed.

- 17. In or about May 2022, Plaintiff staked out a small plot for its experimental vineyard, and laid out a small number of bottomless vessels, each filled with compost and a single rootstock.
- 18. On or about May 11, 2022 the County demanded that Plaintiff permit an inspection of its Property based upon its unfounded speculation that the Property "may be in violation of the Napa County Code" and without specifying any particular violation. Because the County took those steps without first attempting to learn from Plaintiff what activity was actually taking place on the Property, and because the County was unable to cite any specific violation—as there were none—Plaintiff exercised its right to decline the requested inspection.
- 19. The County claims that, on June 13, 2022, it took the step of posting a "Stop Work Order" that directed Plaintiff to stop all of its work to introduce the experimental vineyard onto the Property. Plaintiff, however, did not receive any such notice, and no such notice was posted at the Property. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Stop Work Order—if it was issued as the County claims—was not issued based upon any observed violation of the Conservation Regulations, or any other County Code provision, but rather based merely upon the County's observation of stakes on the Property.
- 20. On or about June 22, 2022, the County citing unattributed "reports" of "vegetation clearing and land preparation for vineyard," falsely accused Plaintiff of: (i) removing at least thirty percent of vegetation canopy, (ii) "earth movement within apparent ephemeral and county

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21. The County's accusations and regulatory demands were at all times entirely baseless. Plaintiff had never removed any vegetation canopy (the Glass Fire did that), never moved any earth on the Property, and as described above, did not engage in any "ground preparation" when laying out its experimental vineyard. Nothing that Plaintiff did implicated the Conservation Regulations in any way.
- 22. The County's accusations and regulatory demands were erroneous and unlawful for at least the following specific reasons:
- a. Section 18.108.020(C) of the Conservation Regulations states only that "[i]n the AW zoning district, a minimum of seventy percent vegetation canopy cover as configured on the parcel existing on June 16, 2016 shall be maintained as part of any use involving earth-disturbing activity." All of the vegetation canopy cover on the Property was removed (incinerated) by the Glass Fire. It was not removed by Plaintiff, and was not removed as part of any earth-disturbing activity.
- b. Section 18.108.025 of the Conservation Regulations prohibits "construction of main or accessory structures, earthmoving activity, grading or removal of vegetation or agricultural uses of land" within certain setbacks from streams unless specifically permitted. "Earthmoving activity" is defined, in relevant part, as "any activity that involves vegetation clearing, grading, excavation, compaction of the soil, or the creation of fills and embankments to

prepare a site for the construction of roads, structures, landscaping, new planting, and other improvements (including agricultural roads, and vineyard avenues or tractor turnaround areas necessary for ongoing agricultural operations)." The Conservation Regulations do not define "vegetation," but that word is commonly understood to refer only to *living* trees and plants. Plaintiff's removal of the dead, charred remains of fire-killed trees and stumps was not vegetation clearing and did not involve excavation, and so was neither "earthmoving activity" nor the clearing or removing of vegetation. It also was not carried out to prepare the Property for any construction, landscaping, new planting or other improvements, both because it was unrelated to Plaintiff's much later decision to introduce the experimental non-erosive vineyard, and because the introduction of that vineyard did not involve "planting," which is not defined by the Conservation Regulations but is commonly understood to refer to the process of putting or setting a seed or plant into a hole or trench dug or tilled into the ground. Plaintiff's removal of the dead, charred remains of fire-killed trees and stumps also was not an activity otherwise prohibited by Section 18.108.025.

c. Section 18.108.060 provides that "no construction, improvement, grading, earthmoving activity or vegetation removal associated with the development or use of land shall take place on those parcels or portions thereof generally having a slope of thirty percent or greater as defined in Section 18.108.060(C) unless exempt under Sections 18.108.050 or 18.108.055 or unless an exception through the use permit process is granted pursuant to Section 18.108.040." (Napa County Code § 18.108.060(A).) As noted in subparagraph (b) above, Plaintiff's removal of the dead, charred remains of fire-killed trees and stumps was not vegetation clearing and did not involve excavation, and so was not "earthmoving activity" as that phrase is defined in Section 18.108.030, and it was not the clearing or removing of "vegetation," as that term is commonly understood. The Conservation Regulations defines "improvement" as "any man-made immovable item which becomes part of, placed on, or affixed to, a parcel of land. (Napa County Code § 18.108.030.) The staking and layout of Plaintiff's experimental non-erosive vineyard was not an "improvement" because the stakes and vessels were moveable, not "immovable," and the rootstock is not "man-made." There was also no "construction" or "grading" that took place

on Plaintiff's Property, either to remove the fire-killed trees and stumps, or to later lay out Plaintiff's experimental, non-erosive vineyard.

- d. Section 18.108.070(A) prohibits "earthmoving activity, grading, improvement, or construction of a structure for nonagricultural purposes" within erosion hazard areas unless done in compliance with the County's NPDES program. While Plaintiff removed the dead, charred remains of fire-killed trees and stumps for a non-agricultural purpose, that activity was not "earthmoving activity" for the reasons explained above, was not "grading" or an "improvement" as those terms are defined in Section 18.108.030, and was not the "construction of a structure." The much later staking of Plaintiff's experimental, non-erosive vineyard certainly was not the construction of a structure (nor any of the other activities prohibited by Section 18.108.070(A)), and was done for an agricultural (not "nonagricultural") purpose—the growing of winegrapes.
- e. Section 18.108.070(B) prohibits agricultural earthmoving activity, grading, or improvement" on slopes over five percent within erosion hazard areas until an erosion control plan has been submitted to, and approved by, the County. For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff did not engage in any "earthmoving activity," and did not construct an "improvement" on its Property. It also did not perform any "grading," which is defined as "stripping, cutting, filling, contouring, recontouring, or stockpiling of earth or land, including in its cut or fill condition." Indeed, the very purpose of Plaintiff's experimental, non-erosive vineyard was to see if a vineyard could be introduced *without* engaging in those activities.
- f. Section 18.108.070(D) provides that "site development shall be conducted in a manner, based upon the topography and soil type, which creates no net increase in erosion." The Conservation Regulations do not define the phrase "site development" or the word "development." Given the context, and the common understanding of those terms, "site development" must refer to those activities for which the Conservation Regulation requires permitting by the County, *i.e.* earthmoving or earth-disturbing activity, construction, grading, improvement and vegetation removal. As set forth above, Plaintiff did not engage in any of those activities. In any event, Plaintiff's activity on the Property was conducted in a manner that

- g. Section 18.108.070(F) applies only to those activities that are subject to the Conservation Regulations and review and approval by the County thereunder, *i.e.* earthmoving or earth-disturbing activity, construction, grading, improvement and vegetation removal. Plaintiff did not engage in any of those activities. Moreover, Section 18.108.070(F) provides only that "vegetation removal shall be limited to the minimum amount necessary to accommodate the project and then only if in compliance with the NPDES program or as indicated on the approved erosion control plan or vineyard replanting program or grading or plot plan if standard erosion control measures were applied." Plaintiff did not remove any vegetation; it removed only the dead, charred remains of fire-killed trees and stumps.
- 23. By August 2022, Plaintiff determined that the potted rootstock successfully rooted into the unprepared ground and reaffirmed, for itself, that the technique did not implicate the Conservation Regulations. On that basis, Plaintiff resumed laying out additional vessels and rootstock on top of the unprepared ground. Ultimately, Plaintiff laid out an experimental, non-erosive vineyard of approximately one-third of an acre in size.
- 24. On September 15, 2022, the County again demanded that Plaintiff permit an inspection of the Property citing unspecified "violation[s] of the Napa County Code."
- 25. On September 19, 2022, counsel for Plaintiff spoke with County Staff to explain the activity that had taken place on the Property and the reasons why that activity did not amount to earthmoving or earth-disturbing activity" and did not otherwise implicate the Conservation Regulations. In response, the County Staff took the unsupported, and unsupportable, position that *any* development of a vineyard on a hillside requires a County-approved Erosion Control Plan. That position is contrary to actual text of the Conservation Regulations, which addresses only vegetation removal, earthmoving or earth-disturbing activity, construction, and improvement, *none of which Plaintiff engaged in.*

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26. The County's unlawful enforcement activity against Plaintiff evidences an intent to wield the Conservation Regulations as a sword against certain property owners, and especially against Plaintiff, and to ensuare those owners in onerous and expensive regulatory processes that significantly delay, or become *de facto* prohibitions on, the permitting of a vineyard. In employing the Conservation Regulations in this manner, the County is acting beyond the scope of its legal authority, and is threatening to deprive Plaintiff of its constitutionally protected property rights. **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

(For Declaratory Relief – Removal of Fire-Killed Tree and Stump Remains)

- 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 26, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 28. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and the County over whether Plaintiff's removal of the charred remains fire-killed trees and stumps is or is not activity regulated by the Conservation Regulations. The County contends that Plaintiff's removal of those remains falls under, and violated, Conservation Regulations Sections 18.108.020(C), 18.108.025, 18.108.060, and 18.108.070(A), (B), (D) and (F). Plaintiff contends that its removal of those remains was not subject to, and did not violate, any of those Sections (or any other part of the Conservation Regulations) for at least the reasons stated above.
- 29. The County has taken the position that, notwithstanding the express language of the Conservation Regulations, Plaintiff's removal of the charred remains of fire-killed trees and stumps constituted "earthmoving activity," "vegetation removal," and the removal of "vegetation canopy cover." The County has also taken the position that virtually any activity undertaken on the Property, no matter its nature, is subject to control under the Conservation Regulations and requires an Erosion Control Plan. The County's position conflicts with the Conservation Regulations themselves, which limit only certain activities, none of which Plaintiff engaged in.
- 30. Plaintiff desires a judicial determination and declaration concerning whether Plaintiff's removal of the charred remains of fire-killed trees and stumps from its Property is or is not subject to the Conservation Regulations, and whether that activity did nor did not violate those

regulations. Such a declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in light of the County's unjustified, and unjustifiable, demands to enter upon Plaintiff's property, as well as the County's demands that Plaintiff hire a professional biologist or botanist to prepare a vegetation mapping of the Property, and that it prepare and file a "restoration plan" to revegetate or naturalize the Property. Absent such declaratory relief, Plaintiff will be subjected to, and required to expend significant sums and effort to respond to, regulatory enforcement activities having no basis in law.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Declaratory Relief – Introduction of Experimental Vineyard)

- 31. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 30, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 32. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and the County over whether Plaintiff's layout of its experimental vineyard is or is not activity regulated by the Conservation Regulations.
- 33. The County contends that Plaintiff's layout of its experimental vineyard constituted "ground preparation" that falls under, and violated, Conservation Regulations Sections 18.108.060 and 18.108.070(A), (B), (D), and (F). Plaintiff contends that its introduction of the experimental vineyard onto its Property was not "ground preparation" and was not subject to, and did not violate, those or any other Conservation Regulations for at least the reasons stated above.
- 34. The County has taken the position that, notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiff's layout of its experimental vineyard is controlled by the Conservation Regulations, and that Plaintiff is required to apply for, and obtain, an Erosion Control Plan in order to continue its experimental vineyard. The County's position conflicts with the Conservation Regulations themselves, which limit only certain activities, none of which Plaintiff engaged in.
- 35. The stated purpose of the Conservation Regulations is "to ensure the continued long-term viability of county agricultural resources by protecting county lands from excessive soil loss which if unprotected could threaten local water quality and quantity and lead ultimately to loss of economic productivity," and "to provide greater environmental protection for natural environmental resources, particularly agricultural lands, forests, wildlife habitat, and water."

(Napa County Code § 18.108.010(A)). The experimental, non-erosive vineyard serves those purposes. Now proven to be successful, the vineyard ensures the continued long-term viability of agricultural resources, protects the Property from soil loss (and thus protects local water quality and quantity), and, if expanded, will serve as a further fire-break in future wildfire events and thus also will protect other county lands.

36. Plaintiff desires a judicial determination and declaration concerning whether Plaintiff's layout of its experimental vineyard is or is not subject to the Conservation Regulations and whether that activity did or did not violate those regulations. Such a declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in light of the County's unjustified, and unjustifiable, demands to enter upon Plaintiff's property, as well as the County's demand that Plaintiff apply for an Erosion Control Permit that the County will never seriously consider or grant. If declaratory relief is not granted, Plaintiff will be subjected to, and required to expend significant sums and effort to respond to, regulatory enforcement activities having no basis in law.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution Article I § 7)

- 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 36, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 38. Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution provides, in part: "A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws."
- 39. "The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment." (*Gray v. Whitmore* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1, 21.)
- 40. The County's selective enforcement of the Conservation Regulations against Glass Fire victims that seek to farm non-erosive vineyards on their hillside properties, and non-enforcement of those same regulations against other Glass Fire victims making other uses of their properties (including leaving them barren) is unsupported by any rational reason. Indeed, refusing to permit the non-erosive introduction of vineyards on burned-out hillsides likely *increases* the risk of erosion because those same hillsides will not return to woodland on any observable

timescale leaving them subject to substantial erosion during precipitation events, while the roots of non-erosive vineyards would substantially assist in controlling that erosion.

- 41. The County's action in seeking to prevent Plaintiff from introducing a non-erosive vineyard on his Property, while allowing similarly-situated property owners to make other uses of their Properties (including agricultural uses, or no uses at all) is arbitrary and capricious, and it unconstitutionally deprives Plaintiff of the equal protection of the law guaranteed under Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution.
- 42. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the County's selective enforcement of the Conservation Regulations against Plaintiff violates Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution.
- 43. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm unless the County is enjoined from enforcing the Conservation Regulations to prohibit Plaintiff from maintaining, or further introducing, a non-erosive vineyard on his Property.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of the Due Process Clause of the California Constitution Article I § 7)

- 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 43, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 45. Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution provides, in part: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
- 46. "Procedural due process requires that before a person is deprived of his life, liberty or property he must be given notice of the proceeding against him, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself, and the propriety of the deprivation must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness." (*Gray, supra,* 17 Cal.App.3d at 21 [citations omitted].)
- 47. "When, as here, a governmental entity vested with broad administrative powers acts in an arbitrary manner so as to affect capriciously the property or property rights of persons subjected to its administrative controls it has denied to those persons due process of law. 'Arbitrary action is not due process.'" (*Walsh v. Kirby* (1974) 13 Cal.3d 95, 105–06 [citation omitted].)

48. The County's attempted enforcement of the Conservation Regulations against
Plaintiff based solely on his introduction of a non-erosive vineyard on his Property is unlawful,
without rational basis, and wholly arbitrary. Any attempted enforcement of the Conservation
Regulations to prohibit Plaintiff from farming his non-erosive vineyard, or to extract other
concessions from him in exchange for the permitting of that non-erosive vineyard, even when the
introduction of that vineyard entailed none of the activities expressly regulated by the
Conservation Regulations is arbitrary, and constitutes a violation of Plaintiff's right to due
process.

49. In addition, the County has violated the California Constitution's guarantee of due process insomuch as their attempted enforcement of the Conservation Regulations fail to provide any meaningful procedure for challenging the applicability of those Regulations to Plaintiff's activities. (*Vaquero Energy, Inc. v. County of Kern* (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 312, 329, *review denied* (Feb. 26, 2020).)

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment as follows:

- 1. For a declaration that Plaintiff's removal of the remains of fire-killed trees and stumps did not violate any of Napa County Code Sections 18.108.020(C), 18.108.025, 18.108.060, and 18.108.070(A), (B), (D) and (F), and is not subject to regulation by the County pursuant to those sections;
- 2. For a declaration that Plaintiff's experimental vineyard, and Plaintiff's introduction of the same onto his Property, did not violate any of Napa County Code Sections 18.108.060 and 18.108.070(A), (B), (D), and (F), and is not subject to regulation by the County pursuant to those sections:
- For a declaration that the County's enforcement of the Conservation Regulations,
 as applied to Plaintiff, constitutes a violation of Plaintiff's rights under the California Constitution
 to equal protection and due process;
- 4. For an order temporarily, preliminarily, and permanently enjoining and prohibiting the County from seeking to enforce the Conservation Regulations against Plaintiff with respect to

2

	3	5. For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in the prosecution of this action pursuant to					
	4	law, including Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5; and					
	5	6. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.					
	6	DATED: October 6, 2022			Respectfully submitted,		
	7			CO	BLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP		
	8						
0	9			By:			
	10			Dy.	JONATHAN R. BASS		
0 0 - 0	11				Attorneys for Plaintiff Hundred Acre Wine Group, Inc.		
0	12						
4 - 4 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 -	13						
∢ -	14						
	15						
- - 1 0	16						
	17						
1	18						
	19						
	20						
	21						
	22						
	23						
	24						
	25						
	26						
	27						
	28						

the experimental, non-erosive vineyard on the Property;

Plaintiff's removal of the remains of fire-killed trees and stumps and/or Plaintiff's introduction of